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Overview of electronic auction
Auction is a common price decision and resource allocation mechanism, the price and assignment of resource is determined according to certain rule set. It can be stated simply by IPO (Input Processing Output), as shown in figure 1. (1) The English or "ascending open-cry" auction. The auctioneer posts the bottom price of the commodity at first, the price raises successively until only one bidder remains. The bidder wins the good at the final price.
(2) Dutch auction. It originates from the sell selling of Dutch flowers (the value of flower decrease over time). The auctioneer announces a decreasing bid starting with the highest possible price. The first bidder stops the auction by expressing his willingness to pay.
(3) 1 st -Price sealed-bid. Each bidder independently submits a single sealed bid. The bidder that submitted the highest bid is awarded the good and pays the amount that he specified in his bid.
(4) 2 nd -price sealed-bid or Vickrey auction. It is almost identical to the previous auction type. The only difference is that the winning bidder has to pay the amount of the second highest bid.
Electronic auction is a networked traditional auction system general consisting of bidders, auctioneers, registration authority and the seller. At present, the security of the electronic auction mainly depends on the auctioneer, but for the openness of Internet and inadequate supervision on electronic auction, the frauds in auction always happen. The IFCC (Internet Fraud Center) 2010 report [17] shows that, auction fraud ranks 4 in the Top 10 Internet fraud behavior, account for 10.3%. On the one hand, the auctioneer which executes the auction protocol may forge the result of auction. For instance, in the Vickrey auction, the auctioneer may forge the second highest price to get more commission [13] . On the other hand, the bids are personal privacy or commercial secrets, especially in spectrum licence auction and mining right, real estate such large auction, the bid is more easily abused [20] . SCET (Secure Computing, Economy and Trust) project investigates the participants' willingness about biding privacy and the result shows that there are 78 percents wish their bid can be kept confidential. Therefore, designing privacy preserving and secure electronic auction is an important issue.
Related work
Paper [1] first applied cryptographic tools in electronic auction and it designed a secure Vickrey auction on the basis of millionaire protocol. Franklin, M.K.，Reiter，Kikuchi，Suzuki, K，F. Brandt etc. proposed numerous schemes for kinds of auction. The auction system with agents is also studied in recent years [21, 22] . All these protocols essentially fall into three categories:
(1) The protocols proposed by Kikuchi [2, 3] relies on the security of distribute computation. This is achieved by using techniques like verifiable secret sharing and secure multiparty function evaluation. Bidders send shares of their bids to m auctioneers (most a majority must be trustworthy), and then the auctioneers jointly compute the selling price without ever knowing a single bid.
(2) Other protocols introduce a new third party that is not fully trusted which can prune the auctioneer's ability to falsify the auction outcome and reveal confidential information. However, these approaches make weak assumptions about the trustworthiness of this third-party. In [4, 5] , the third party should not collude with any participants; in [6, 7] it is prohibited that the third party and the auctioneer collude.
(3) Bidder-resolved auctions. F. Brandt firstly proposed auction protocols without auctioneers [8] and the concept of full privacy, solve the 1st-Price sealed-bid auction and Vickrey auction. Bidders themselves jointly compute the auction outcome without relying on trusted third parties at all; afterwards, paper [9, 10] introduced the secure multi-party mechanism for (M+1)-st auction and multiunit auction. Table 1 shows the auction settings that F.Brandt has solved with protocols without auctioneers. K. Suzuki et al propose secure multi-party solution for (M+1)-st auction and combinatorial auction without auctioneer, but these protocols needs a trustful third party for key management. As the E-commerce matures, in different kinds of auctions, Vickrey auction is celebrated in economics for having characteristics of incentive compatibility, Pareto efficiency and individual rationality. This thesis design a secure auction protocol without auctioneers for (M+1)-st auction (is the Vickrey auction in the case of M=1). In the traditional similar protocols, the unsuccessful bidder may be offline in the stage of opening bid, causing the price can't be calculated. Our protocol solves the problem with threshold ElGamal encryption, as long as the winning bidder are present, the winning price could be worked out. Moreover, the efficiency has improved compared with previous protocol.
Preliminary
Secure multi-party computation
SMC, Secure Multi-party Computation means that there are n participants 1 , 2,… in a mutually distrustful multi user network, holds secret data ; they wish to compute the function ( 1 , 2 , … , ) = ( 1 , 2 , … , ) and only obtain without disclosing x i to other participants. SMC was first proposed by A.C.Yao in the form of millionaire problem [14] , paper [15] has further developed the SMC theory, proved theoretically that any SMC problem can be solved with the circuit evaluation. However, this solution was impractical based on the consideration of efficiency. We have to advance practical method for specific SMC problem.
There are two models in secure multi-party computation, the semi-honest model and the malicious model. A semi-honest party is one who follows the protocol properly with the exception that it keeps a record of all its intermediate computations. All the adversaries are passive in semi-honest model. Malicious parties may refuse to participate in the protocol, substitute their local input or intermediate result, and even abort the protocol prematurely. The adversaries are active in malicious model.
Definition of security in semi-honest model
Let : ({0,1} * ) → ({0,1} * ) be an m-ary functionality, where ( 1 , … , ) denotes the i th elements of ( 1 , … , ). We let
( ̅ ) = ( , , 1 , … , ) denoted the view of i th party during an execution of Π on ̅ = { 1 , … , }, where represent the i th party's internal coin tosses, and represent the j th message the i th party has received. For = { 1 , … , } , we let
) .The output of the i th party after an execution of Π is denoted as ( ̅ ). (General case) We say that Π privately computes f if there exist polynomial-time algorithm denoted S, such that for every I as above
where ( ̅ ) denote the output sequence of all parties during the execution represented in ( ̅ ).
ElGamal encryption
System parameters: p is a large prime number so that the discrete logarithm problem in is computationally infeasible. g is a generating element of group * . M is the plaintext. Private key: choose ∈ at random as private key Public key: = mod Encryption: choose ∈ at random to encrypt message , ( ) = ( , ) = ( mod , = mod ) Decryption: = /( )mod ElGamal encryption has three properties as listed below, Property 1: Semantic security ( ) is created using random number , from ( 0 , 1 , ( )) where ∈ {0,1}, one cannot find ∈ {0,1} with probability greater than one half. Property 2: Homomorphic encryption If ( 1 , 1 ) = ( 1 , 1 ) , ( 2 , 2 ) = ( 2 , 2 ) then ( 1 , 1 ) ( 2 , 2 ) = ( 1 2 , 1 + 2 ) = (α 1 α 2 , β 1 β 2 ), 1 and 2 are the random number selected for encryption.
Property 3: Randomization If ( ) = ( , ), (1) = � ′ , ′ �, we can get a new randomization ciphertext of message M,
Zero-knowledge proof of ElGamal encryption
Cramer et al proposed [16] that Alice can prove an ElGamal encrypted value( , ) = ( , ) either decrypts to 1 or a fixed value ∈ without revealing which is the case according to the following steps:
Step1: If = 1 , Alice chooses 1 , 1 , at random and sends 1 = 1 1 , 1 = 1 � � 1 , 2 = , 2 = to Bob. If = , Alice chooses 2 , 2 , at random and sends ( , ) ， 1 = , 1 = , 2 = 2 2 , 2 = 2 2 to Bob.
Step 2: Bob chooses c at random and sends it to Alice.
Step 3: If = 1, Alice sends 1 , 2 = ( − 1 )mod , 1 , 2 = ( − 2 )mod to Bob; If = , Alice sends 1 = ( − 2 )mod , 2 , 1= ( − 1 )mod , 2 to Bob.
Step 4: Bob checks = 1 + 2 mod , 1 = 1 1 , 1 = 1 � � 1 , 2 = 2 2 , 2 = 2 2 .
Threshold ElGamal encryption
In (t,n)-threshold ElGamal schema the private and public key is generated by all the participants , at least t participants perform the decryption, they can obtain the plaintext. 1. Distribute key generation
(1) Each participants choose a ( − 1)-degree polynomial at random
compute mod ，where = 0 = (0) is the private key, and broadcast it.
(2) Each participants compute = mod = ∑ =1 mod as public key. mod .
Encryption:
Chooses ∈ at random to encrypt message M, ( ) = ( , ) = ( mod , mod ).
Threshold decryption:
Each player publish the value = , along with a Zero-knowledge proof of correct exponentiation; each player choose 1 , 2 … , , so = = ∏ =1 ( = 1,2 … ) is the LaGrange coefficient for the share, satisfies = 1 1 + ⋯ + .
Privacy preserving M+1-st price auction protocol
Problem description
Our setting consists of one seller and N bidders, the seller provide M (M≤N) indistinguishable units of a single kind of goods, each bidder win at most one unit. = { 1 , 2 , … , } is the set of possible evaluation values, each bidder select one element ( ∈ [1, ]) from as his bid. At the end of the auction, all the bids can be represented by vector = ( 1 , 2 , … , ), the M+1-st highest price is the winning price , and M bidders who bid higher prices than the winning price are winning bidders, each winning bid buys one unit of the goods at the M+1-st winning price.
Computing the winning price and the identity of the winning bidder without disclosing each evaluation value, this protocol is called privacy preserving M+1-st price auction protocol.
Building block
Lemma Generalized threshold ElGamal homomorphism n participants 1 , 2 , … encrypt message 1 , 2 … , respectively, let = 1 2 ··· . The private key generated by threshold ElGamal encryption is = ∑ =1
, where is the private key of . The public key correspond to the private key is = ∏ =1 mod = ∑ =1 mod . Then each share with 1 , 2 , … , the share about secret key x gets is . Encryption: each participant chooses 1 , 2 , … , ∈ at random and encrypts M i respectively, ( ) = ( , ) = ( mod , mod ), then broadcasts the encrypted values. According to the homomorphic property, we can compute ( ) = ( 1 2 ··· ) = ( , )
mod . Decryption: each participant publish the value , along with a zero-knowledge proof of correct exponentiation; each player choose 1 , 2 … , , so = = ∏ =1 ( = 1,2 … ) is the LaGrange coefficient for the share, satisfies = 1 1 + ⋯ + . The protocol designed in this paper represents the bid value as a k-dimensional vector, and then calls at most ⌈log ⌉ times lemma of generalized threshold ElGamal homomorphism to find the wining price by performing a binary search.
Auction protocol
The sell posts information about the M units of goods on the bulletin board and declares to use M+1-st auction, and published an element (≠ 1).
Bidding All the N bidders employ (M, N)-threshold ElGamal encryption to generate the private key
, where is the private key of . The public key correspond to the private key is = ∏ =1 mod = ∑ =1 mod . Then each share with 1 , 2 , … , the share about secret key x gets is .
Suppose � until find j satisfying ( ) ≥ + 1 and ( + 1) ≤ , so the winning price is = .
Identify the winning bidder
The winning bidder sends the random number to the seller in a sealed manner and the seller verifies the data of j th column on bulletin board is equal to ( ).
Example
Suppose there are 1 seller and 7 bidders intend to come to an agreement on the selling of 3 units of undistinguished goods. = {1,2, … 8} is the set of possible evaluation values. At the end of the auction, the bid vector is = (7,8,4,3,6,5,2) , by applying M+1-st auction, we can obtain the winning bidder are the 1 th , 2 th and 5 th bidder, they pay the winning price = 5.
The privacy preserving M+1-st auction is executed as follows:
1. Bidding All the 7 bidders employ (3, 7)-threshold ElGamal encryption to generate the private key = ∑ mod 7 =1 , where is the private key of ( = 1,2 … 7). The public key correspond to the private key is = ∏ 7 =1 mod = ∑ 7 =1 mod . Then each share with 1 , 2 , … , the share about secret key x gets is . Each bidder generates his bid vector ���⃗ according to his bid value, then encrypts the vector with public key y (the random numbers used for encryption are 1 , 2 , … , ) and publish on the bulletin board: Table 2 . Data on the bulletin board Bidder
The encrypted bid vector (1), (1), (1), (1)) (1), (1), (1), (1), (1)) (1), (1), (1), (1), (1), (1) ) mod to obtain Z 4 ( 4 ≥ 3 + 1 ); after that, the bidders compute the product of data in 6 th column and obtain ( 3 ) , similarly, we can compute
) mod and obtain Z 3 (3≤3) after decrypting. So the winning price is = . th winning bidder sends the random number 16 , 26 , 56 to the seller in a sealed manner and the seller verifies the data of 6th column on bulletin board is equal to ( ).
Analysis
Correctness
According to the homomorphic property of threshold ElGamal encryption,
) published by the bidder and compute (
) 1 1 +⋯+ , where ( = 1,2 … ) is the LaGrange coefficient for the share.
We can compute the number of bid ( ), where bid value not less than a certain price j, and then apply binary search to find . Moreover, based on the information on the bulletin board, the result can be verified by the bidder and the seller publicly.
In the malicious model, we need to use Zero-knowledge proof of ElGamal encryption to prove that the encrypted value either decrypts to 1 or to fixed value Z.
2. Security During the process of Winner price determination, suppose n bidders input their component of bid, 1 , … . Let � = ( 1 , 2 , … , ), so ( � ) = ( ). At first, we construct a simulator S to simulate the input of player P 1 , the process is as follows:
Step 1: The simulator S takes ( 1 , ( � )) as input
Step 2: The simulator S chooses 1 ′ , 2 ′ , … , ′ at random, encrypts 1 , 2 ′ , … , ′ with public key y and obtains ( 1 ), then computes
Step 3: Based on the analysis above, the output of simulator S is
and ElGamal encryption is semantic security, namely for ( 0 , 1 , ( )) where ∈ {0,1}, one cannot find ∈ {0,1} with probability greater than one half.
Similarly, we can construct simulators for other bidders. On the basis of the definition of security in semi-honest model, in the process of winner price determination, the bidders can't get any information about other bidders except for the count of bid which not less than a certain price, thus we can identify if the current price is winner price or not in accordance with the count of bid.
While identifying the winning bidder, the winning bidder sends the random number to the seller in a sealed manner, therefore only the seller and the winning bidder know the identity.
For the non-reputation of the bid, the bidder should attach their digital signature while submitting their bid to the bulletin board.
3. Performance In the bidding stage, each bidder needs ElGamal encryption k times, each encryption needs exponentiation two times and modular multiplication one time; in the loop of winning price determination, we need exponentiation one time and modular multiplication 2n+t times, the loop execute at most ⌈log ⌉ times. We use T e to represent the exponentiation and T m to represent the modular multiplication, the protocol complexity compared with paper [9] is shown in table 3: 2 + 2 + ( + (2 + ) )⌈log ⌉ (1 + 2 + 5 ) + 2
Conclusion
This paper proposes a privacy preserving (M+1)-st auction protocol without auctioneer and analyses the correctness and security. This protocol is on the basis of threshold ElGamal encryption, the bidders compute the result without auctioneer and other third party. Our protocol reached the requirement of security electronic auction, moreover, can deal with the situation that the unsuccessful bidder offline while opening bid.
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